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I. JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2d-3 (2) (e) 1987 granting appeals from district 
court in criminal cases involving a third degree felony. 
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction entered in 
Second Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State Tax Matter No. 41308. 
Defendant was convicted of one count of possession of a controlled 
substance without tax stamps affixed in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§58-19-106 (1988); a third degree felony. 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the UTAH ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT violates 
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination as guaranteed by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
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2. Whether the UTAH ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP ACT violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution because 
it is impermissibly vague. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE 
"No persons shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law." Utah Const., art. I, § 7. 
"The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself;" Utah Const., art. I, §12. 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law." U. S. Const., amend. V. 
-2-
"No state shall , deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property without due process o\ a> ,t., 
j i in,'UN I \ I V 'ij 2 . 
i i^- iui through 107 (1988) (Addendum " A ) . 
v STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, David Davis was charged - one count of possess 
contrc . 
i m>> mvuivcinciit in u. P \ rip 
narcotics transaction. Prio* ^ „*»*, Daw* i i i . j J. .:._L,.U ,. disn .NS .:.aiming 
that the statute under which he was charged u :- unconstitutional The 
trial court denied the motion and Davis entered a conditional plea, c f 
no-contest, speci N nreservo 
There are uu mti i material t^ Uic consideration ui ihi^ appe*i;, nc 
only issue is a -o^-- >-• . , ' • whether the MatuK: ' - .ue^ !~n is 
in iconstitutional. 
.3 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution prohibit the State from 
compelling an individual to give testimonial evidence. The Utah Illegal 
Drug Stamp Tax Act, compels individuals dealing in drugs to give 
testimonial evidence by requiring them to purchase tax stamps and to affix 
the stamps to the drugs. Therefore, the Utah Act is unconstitutional 
because it violates the privilege against self-incrimination as guaranteed 
by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitutiona and Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
I I . The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution prohibits laws which are impermissibly vague. A law 
is impermissibly vauge if it encourages arbitray and discriminatroy 
enforcement. Arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement occurs whenever 
the legislature fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern those 
responsible for enforcing the law. These guidelines must be susceptible of 
uniform interpretation and application by law enforcement. In this regard, 
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Ihc Utah Ac I encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement because 
if fails to provide uniform standards determining whether an ind; 
l i a s u l l i ^ I l C i I ( I n . i 11 it i mi I ^ I i in," i i t i l I I I M I I ' ill I \ > l i i i i i | 111 I . " i HI 1111 *m 1 v. 
whether ai1 individual has 
complied with this requirement. Since the Utah Legislature has failed 
establish tl minimal regulations required b\ N.ih tic ITrab -V * it-c i r and 
those required u " du~ process, the Utah •:;-^  ••*;; — .: . v ^ , , p in 
violation 
( 'on si il II 
VII. ARGUMENT 
I THE UTAH ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE 
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AS GUARAN i l l I) 
BY THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
The Fifth Amendment ^ .._
 w _ States Constitution states that: 
"No person shall be compelled ' -\ »'.••; ,J! . ;t ^ \- u~ - *.v:tness 
against himself." The T Amendment proMuc^ .... :^*t not • 
information 
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criminal proceeding. Garner v. United States. 424 U. S. 648, 653 (1974). 
The rights provided by the amendment arise whenever the government 
seeks information that will subject the individual to criminal liability. kL 
at 655. 
In Marchetti v. United States, the Supreme Court found a federal 
occupational tax on wagering to unconstitutionally require an individual to 
incriminate himself. 390 U. S. 39, 42 (1968). Under the federal statute in 
M a r c h e t t i . an individual was required to register with the Internal 
Revenue Service buy wagering stamps, and post the stamps in a 
conspicuous place. IdL at 42-43. The Court found the statute created a 
"real and appreciable . . . hazard of incrimination." Id. at 48. The Supreme 
Court found that the "petitioner was confronted by a comprehensive 
system of federal and state prohibitions agsinst wagering activities, he was 
required to provide information which he might reasonably suppose would 
be available to prosecuting authorities, and which would surely prove a 
significant 'link in a chain of evidence tending to establish his guilt.'" Ld. 
(citations omitted). 
-6-
While the Utah Act does not require registration, the mere purchase 
of the stamps is an admission of illegal activity under Utah Code Ann. 
§59-19-107 (2) (1988). The law does not apply to persons lawfully in 
possession of cocaine, but only to individuals unlawfully in possession of 
cocaine. Thus, unlike the statute in Marche t t i . the mere purchase of the 
stamps is an admission of criminal behavior. In Marchetti, the Court found 
that wagering was an area permeated with criminal statutes and those 
engaging in wagering were a group "inherently suspect of criminal 
activities." Id., at 47 (citations omitted). In this case, those subject to the 
statute are not only suspect of criminal activities, but by law, are guilty of 
criminal activity. Therefore, the mere act of purchasing the stamps is an 
admission of criminal behavior and being compelled to purchase these 
stamps violates the Fifth Amendment. 
Not only does the Utah Act violate the Fifth Amendment by 
compelling individuals to purchase the stamps, but the additional 
requirement that the stamps be displayed also violates the Fifth 
Amendment. The posting of the stamps on the contraband is an admission 
that the defendant had knowledge of the illegal nature of the substance 
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which is an element of the offense. As a result, the act of posting the 
stamp is a "link in a chain of evidence tending to establish his guilt." 
Marche t t i . at 48 (citation omitted). Nowhere in the act does it say that 
evidence that an individual posted the stamps on the contraband is 
inadmissible at trial to show knowledge of the illegal nature of the 
substance. Therefore, as in M a r c h e t t i . these requi rements 
unconstitutionally compel an individual to incriminate himself in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The self-incrimination provision of the Utah Constitution is found in 
Article I, Section 12, which provides: The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself." Utah Const, art. I, §12 (emphasis added). 
Article I, Section 12 is limited in scope to those situations where the state 
seeks evidence of a "testimonial or communicative nature." American Fork 
Citv v. Crosgrove. 701 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1985). Therefore, the Utah 
Act violates the privilege against self-incrimination if it compels an 
individual to give testimonial or communicative evidence. 
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The Utah Act clearly meets the requirement of compulsion. In 
Cosgrove. the Utah Supreme Court stated in this regard: 
Complusion need not, of course, be physical; it may as 
well be accomplished by the States' attaching to the 
alternative course of action a penalty, punishment or 
detriment for the imposition of which no other 
justification exists and of which the defendant is 
therefore entitled to be free, if to avoid that 
unwarranted threatened consequence, the defendant 
produces what is self-incriminating evidence, that 
evidence is fairly to be regarded as having been compelled 
and thus constitutionally inadmissible in a criminal 
proceeding against him. 
id. at 1071 (citing People v. Thomas. 46 N.Y. 2d 100, 412 N. Y. S. 2d 
845, 849, 385 N.E 2d 584, 587 (1978). 
Since Davis was compelled to purchase the tax stamps by the threat of 
criminal prosecution for failure to affix the stamps, he has been deprived 
of this rights under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
With respect to the requirement of "testimonial" evidence, Article I, 
Section 12 "establishes a relationship . . .between the accused and the State 
that prevents the State from extracting confessions or admissions by 
whatever means it may devise." Crosgrove. 701 P.2d at 1075 (Stewart., J. 
concurring). As previously discussed, the mere purchase of stamps is an 
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admission of illegal activity under §59-19-107 (2). Therefore, the Utah Act 
violates Article I, Section 12 because it allows the State to extract 
"admissions" by the devised scheme of requiring an individual to purchase 
drug tax stamps or face criminal prosecution. 
11. THE UTAH ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT VIOLATES 
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BECAUSE 
IT IS IMPERMISSIBLY VAGUE 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
prohibits vague laws. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside. Hoffman 
Es t a t e s . 455 U. S. 489 (1982). In Hoffman Estates, the United States 
Supreme Court explained the prohibition against vague laws further 
stating: 
Vague laws offend several important values. First, 
because we assume that man is free to steer between 
lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the 
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity 
to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. 
Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair 
warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement 
is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standard for 
those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates 
basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for 
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the 
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applications. 
Id. at 497. 
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In Kolender v. Lawson. 466 U. S. 352 (1983) the court estabished the 
constitutional standard for determining whether a statute is impermissibly 
vague. In this regard, the court stated: "the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient 
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement." id. at 357. 
A. The Utah Act encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement because it fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern 
law-enforcement. 
The Utah Act forbids a cocaine dealer from possessing cocaine unless 
the illegal drug tax is paid upon the cocaine. Section 59-19-105 (3) 
provides: "Payments requred by this chapter shall be made to the 
commission on forms provided by the commission. Dealers are not 
required to give their name, address, social security number, or other 
identifying information on this form. The commission shall collect all taxes 
imposed under this chapter." Therefore, the only way the State of Utah can 
determine whether Davis violated the law is by whether he properly 
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exhibited the required stamps. In this regard, §59-19-104 (1) states: "The 
commission shall adopt a uniform system of providing, affixing and 
displaying official stamps, official labels, or other official indicia for 
marijuana and controlled substances on which a tax is imposed. (See 
Addendum "A"). 
To date, however, the commission has failed to adopt any regulations 
under §59-19-104 (1). As a result, Davis had no guidance on where to 
place the stamps. Furthermore, the arresting officer could not know 
where to look for the stamps. Therefore, absent the required regulations, 
the Utah Act failed to provide sufficient guidance to Davis on how to 
comply with its requirements and failed to provide the arresting officers 
with a method of determining whether Davis was in violation of the law. 
The Utah Act, unaccompanied by the required regulations "confers 
on police a virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge a person with 
a violation of the [statute] is unconstitutional because the opportunity for 
abuse, especially where a statute has received a virtually open-ended 
interpretation is self evident." Board of Airport Commissioners of the City 
of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., —U. S.—, 107 S. Ct. 2568, 2573 
(1987). Without the legally required regulations, the statute is 
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unconstitutionally vague in that it fails to provide citizens with the 
knowledge necessary to allow them to comply with the law in that a dealer 
does not know where to place the stamp in order to follow the law. 
In addition, without the regulations state agents cannot tell whether 
or not an individual is complying with the law since they do not know 
where to look for the properly posted stamps. As a result, the opportunity 
for abuse and illegal arrests is flagrant in that the authorities cannot 
determine what behaviors violate the law since they cannot determine 
whether an individual has obtained the stamps and whether the stamps 
are properly posted. Certainly in interpreting the validity of a statute in 
light of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a Court may consider other 
judicial or enforcement agency regulations. Kolender. at 355. But in this 
case, the State Tax Commission has failed to fulfill its mandated task of 
developing such regulations. Absent the required regulations, the statute 
must be found to be constitutionally invalid as defined by the standard 
established in Kolender. 
In Kolender. the United States Supreme Court struck down a statute 
which required an individual to provide "credible and reliable" 
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identification when asked by a police officer having a reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity. The Court found that the statute was deficient in that 
it had no standard for determining whether a suspect had satisfied the 
requirement of providing credible and reliable identification, thereby 
vesting complete discretion to the police officer to determine whether the 
individual had complied. In this regard, the Court stated: 
Although the [vagueness] doctrine focuses both on actual 
notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have 
recognized recently that the more important aspect of the 
vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other 
principal element of the doctrine--the requirement that a 
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement." Where the legislature fails to provide such 
minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit "a 
standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, 
and juries to pursue their personal predilections." 
Id., at 574, 94 S. Ct. at 1248 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Like the statute issue in Kolender . the Utah Act fails to provide a 
uniform standard for determining whether a suspect has satisfied the 
requirement of affixing the tax stamps and vests complete discretion in law 
enforcement to determine whether an individual has complied. Therefore, 
the Utah Act lacks the most important aspect of the vagueness 
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doctrine-"the requirement that a legislative establish minimal guidelines to 
govern law enforcement." Since the Utah Legislative has failed to establish 
the minimal regulations required by both the Act itself and Kolender , it 
also must be struck down. 
The Utah Supreme Court has likewise set forth a standard for 
determing whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague. For a statute to 
be valid: 
It must be sufficiently definate (a) to inform persons 
of ordinary intelligence who could be law abiding, 
what their conduct must be to confirm to its requirements; 
(b) to advise a defendant accused of violating it just what 
constitutes the offense with which he is charged, and 
(c) to be susceptible of uniform interpretation and 
application by those charged with responsibility of 
applying and enforcing it. 
State v. Packard. 250 P.2d 561 (Utah 1952) (emphasis added). 
Absent the necessary uniform regulations, the Utah Act is not 
susceptible of uniform interpretation nor application by those charged with 
the responsibility of applying and enforcing the law. Quite simply, dealers 
don't know where to place the stamps and law enforcement officers do not 
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know where to look. Therefore, the Utah Act does not meet the standards 
for validity established in Packard and accordingly, is unconstitutionally 
vague. 
nx. CONCLUSION 
Based on the authorities presented, appellant seeks reversal of his 
conviction and an acquittal because his conviction was based on a statute 
which is unconstitutional. 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
PATRICIA GEARY 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDEMDUM " A " 
ILLEGAL DRUG STAMP TAX ACT 59-19-103 
CHAPTER 19 







Short Li tie. 
Definitions. 
Tax imposed on marihuana and 
controlled substances. 
Stamps, evidencing tax paid to be 
provided and sold by the com-
mission. 
Stamps to be affixed to mari-




— Anonymity provided when 
purchasing stamps. 
Civil penalty — Criminal penalty 
— Statute of limitations — Bur-
den of proof. 
Commission to administer tax — 
No criminal immunity for 
dealers. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1988, ch. l i , et seq. by Laws 1988, ch. 246, §§ 1 to 7, the 
S§ 1 to 14, also enacted a new $ 59-19-101 et provisions enacted by Laws 1988, ch. 11, were 
seq. Because of the enactment of $ 59-19-101 renumbered as $ 59-20-101 et seq. 
59-19-101- Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act." 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-101, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8 
1988, ch. 246, § 1. makes the act effective on April 1, 1988. 
59-19-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Controlled substance" means any drug or substance, whether real 
or counterfeit, as defined in Section 58-37-2, that is held, possessed, trans-
ported, transferred, sold, or offered to be sold in violation of Utah laws. It 
does not include marihuana. 
(2) "Dealer" means a person who, in violation of Utah law, manufac-
tures, produces, ships, transports, or imports into Utah or in any manner 
acquires or possesses more than 42lA» grams of mar ihuana , or seven or 
more grams of any controlled substance, or ten or more dosage units of 
any controlled substance which is not sold by weight. 
(3) "Marihuana" means any marihuana, whether real or counterfeit, as 
defined in Section 58-37-2, that is held, possessed, t ransported, t rans-
ferred, sold, or offered to be sold in violation of Utah laws. 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-102, enacted by L. 
1988. ch. 246, § 2. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8 
makes the act effective on April 1, 1988. 
59-19-103. Tax imposed on mar ihuana and control led sub-
stances. 
(1) A tax is imposed on marihuana and controlled substances as defined 
under this chapter at the following rates: 
(a) on each gram of marihuana, or each portion of a gram, $3.50; 
143 
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J9-19-104 REVENUE AND TAXATION 
(b) on each gram of controlled substance, or each portion of a gram, 
$200; and 
(c) on each 50 dosage units of a controlled substance that is not sold by 
weight, or portion thereof, $2,000. 
(2) For the purpose of calculating the tax under this chapter, a quant i ty of 
narihuana or other controlled substance is measured by the weight of the 
ubstance, whether pure or impure or dilute, or by dosage units when the 
ubstance is not sold by weight, in the dea le r s possession. A quant i ty of a 
ontrolled substance is dilute if it consists of a detectable quanti ty of pure 
ontrolled substance and any excipients or fillers. 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-103, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8 
988, ch. 246, § 3. makes the act effective on April 1, 1988. 
S9-19-104. Stamps, evidencing tax paid to be provided and 
sold by the commission. 
(1) The commission shall adopt a uniform system of providing, affixing, and 
iisplaying official stamps, official labels, or other official indicia for mari-
juana and controlled substances on which a tax is imposed. 
(2) A dealer may not possess any marihuana or controlled substance upon 
v'hich a tax is imposed by this chapter, unless the tax has been paid on the 
narihuana or other controlled substance as evidenced by a s tamp or other 
•fTicial indicia. 
(3) Official stamps, labels, or other indicia to be affixed to all mar ihuana or 
ontrolled substances shall be purchased from the commission. The purchaser 
hall pay 100% of face value for each stamp, label, or other indicia a t the t ime 
f the purchase. 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-10-i, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8 
988, ch. 246, § 4. makes the act effective on April 1, 1988. 
•9-19-105. Stamps to be affixed to mar ihuana and con-
trolled substance — Anonymity provided when 
purchasing stamps. 
(1) When a dealer purchases, acquires, transports, or imports into this s tate 
lar ihuana or controlled substances, he shall permanently affix the official 
idicia on the marihuana or controlled substances evidencing the payment of 
le tax required under this chapter. No stamp or other official indicia may be 
sed more than once. 
(2) Taxes imposed upon marihuana or controlled substances by this chapter 
re due and payable immediately upon acquisition or possession in this s tate 
y a dealer. 
(3) Payments required by this chapter shall be made to the commission on 
•rms provided by the commission. Dealers are not required to give their 
ame, address, Social Security number, or other identifying information on 
ie form. The commission shall collect all taxes imposed under this chapter. 
144 
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ENTERPRISE ZONE ACT 5 9 - 1 9 - 1 0 7 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-105, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8 
88, ch. 246, § 5. makes the act elective on April 1, 1988. 
9-19-106. Civil penalty — Criminal penal ty — Statute of 
limitations — Burden of proof. 
(1) Any dealer violating this chapter is subject to a penalty of 100% of the 
ix in addition to the tax imposed by Section 59-19-103. The penalty shall be 
)llected as part of the tax. 
(2) In addition to the tax penalty imposed, a dealer distr ibuting or possess-
\g marihuana or controlled substances without affixing the appropriate 
tamps, labels, or other indicia is guilty of a felony of the third degree and is 
ubject to a fine of not more than $10,000, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301. 
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of the criminal laws of this s tate, 
n information, indictment, or complaint may be filed upon any criminal 
•flense under this chapter within six years after the commission of this of-
ense. 
(4) Any tax and penalties assessed by the commission are presumed to be 
alid and correct. The burden is on the taxpayer to show their incorrectness or 
nvalidity. 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-106, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8 
1988, ch. 246, § 6. makes the act effective on April 1, 1988. 
59-19-107. Commission to adminis ter tax — No criminal 
immunity for dealers . 
(1) The commission shall administer this chapter and may adopt rules nec-
essary to enforce this chapter. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter requires persons lawfully in possession of mari-
huana or a controlled substance to pay the tax required under this chapter. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter provides immunity of any kind for a dealer from 
criminal prosecution under Utah law. 
History: C. 1953, 59-19-107, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 246, § 8 
1988, ch. 246, § 7. makes the act effective on April 1, 1988. 
CHAPTER 20 
ENTERPRISE ZONE ACT 
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